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The highly developed manufactory period — i.e. the time when ma­
nufactories play the leading role in the industrial production of the na­
tional economy — thrusts into prominence the industrial bourgeoisie, 
and, in addition, all forces which are interested in the development of a 
national capitalist industry in a state still having a feudal structure. 
These forces of independent capitalist development inevitably start on 
the road to realizing the historical tasks of the bourgeois nation: first 
they set as their aim cap ita list development; the second is independen t 
capitalist development. Namely capitalist development is nothing else 
but replacement of a state of feudal structure by one of bourgeois struc­
ture, substitution of feudal production relations with capitalist production 
relations. T h is  task is realized by the bourgeois revolution. And the realiza­
tion of independen t capitalist development is nothing else but the creation 
of national independence in any country which was oppressed bv another 
in the order of feudalism. T h is  is the reason w hy the era o f  the bourgeois 
revolution  is  at the sam e tim e the era o f  the struggle fo r  na tiona l independence  
in, the stage w hen cap ita list developm ent is  ta k in g  shape.
I t is not our task to discuss this question in its general, historical 
aspects; but what we think to be our task is to speak of this question 
concretely, in its correlations to the textile in d u stry . The mass basis of the 
development of the capitalist national textile industry is provided by the 
mass production of small commodities by the country’s peasantry. But 
further possibilities of development are ensured only if the capitalist 
forms of production branching off from this root (scattered and centralized 
manufactories, rudimentary factory industry) are not destroyed, not oust­
ed from the market, by the competition of a more developed external 
textile industry. And this danger is not a small one in circumstances where 
the textile industry occupies the leading place in the national economy 
of any country starting on the road to capitalism, i.e. w hen the bourgeoisie 
o f  all countries p u ts  on  the agenda the developm ent o f  the sam e in d u str ia l  
branch — the textile  in d u s try  — nearly at the sam e tim e. In such circumstan­
ces the question of national independence is by no means some principle
of theoretical character: its most practical contents are the protection 
of the home textile industry from outside dangers, arid — secondarily — 
its supporting by domestic means. It is therefore that in this era national 
independence is manifest concretely in establishing protective tariff 
systems for textiles. We shall see later how the problem of the textile 
market — to protect the own market from the stronger, and to conquer 
external, weaker markets — determines the policy of states emerging 
at that time. “Within the bourgeoisie itself . . . there are two different 
views dominating in connection with industry and trade” writes Engels.1 
“ But it admits of no doubt that the party of protective and differential 
tariffs is incomparably the mightiest, the strongest in number and weight. 
And indeed, the bourgeoisie cannot support itself, consolidate itself, . . . 
unless it fosters and protects its industry and trade by artificial means.”
The case was not different in England by the time the home textile 
industry had emerged, developing manufactories had outpaced their 
competitors. The stormtroops demanding English protective tariffs and 
state subsidy for the industry were the owners of the textile manufacto­
ries, after the “glorious revolution” of 1688 these demanded a protective 
tariff for their own industry against the French and Dutch manufactories 
and they succeeded. Adam Smith wrote: “ . . . more than any other class 
of workers, our woolen goods manufacturers succeeded in persuading 
legislation that the welfare of the nation depends on the success and ex­
pansion of their trade. Through the complete prohibition to import wool 
cloth from foreign countries, they obtained a monopoly against the con­
sumer, and they even got another monopoly against the sheep-farmers 
and the wool-producers through a likewise complete prohibition to export 
living sheep and wool”.2 At the same time the state paid bonuses on the 
importation of anil, raw hemp and flax, and raw silk, while the exporta­
tion of these raw materials was prohibited under severe penalty.3 But it 
was exactly the descendants of this burgeoisie, the industrial capitalists 
and owners of textile factories, who became the heroes of the propaganda 
against the protective system at a time when the English textile industry 
had outpaced all its competitors in the field of up-to-dateness, technical 
facilities, production capacity, etc. The Anticorn-law-league, the league 
against the corn duty, was formed in 1838 headed by Oobden, a textile 
manufacturer of Manchester. It was under the pressure of such demands 
that in 1845 Peel introduced “free trade”, the free trade policy of England, 
with the purpose of inducing the trading partners to adopt a similar po­
licy.4
Yet meanwhile the “protective tariff party”, the most self-conscious 
and resolute group of industrial capitalists (textile manufacturers first 
of all), emerged in all advanced countries. In the United Stales of America, 
in the period preceding the War of Independence, this group formed not 
a “protective tariff” partly because of the British colonizers’ measures 
that prevented all protection of home industries, but formed an alliance 
for the social protection of home industries, i.e. a boycott of the British 
goods. The result was considerable: British imports to the States dropped
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to 37% in one year.5 The boycott alliance comprised 11 of the 13 States, 
and created such an intense national feeling that those violating the boy­
cott regulations sometimes had to face the retaliation with “the lashing 
pole, ta r and feather” .0 The industrial capitalists of the young American 
post-war republic soon adopted the protective policy. Alexander Hamil­
ton, a highly gifted statesman, took a stand for the industrial protective 
tariffs; his ingenious plan was to make the United States “in the image 
of Great Britain of that time”7, i.e. to turn the States on the road of in­
dependent capitalist development. And despite the fact that Hamilton 
died young, and the petty bourgeois Jefferson of democratic aspirations 
was elected president of the States, the republic started on the road plan­
ned by Hamilton as a matter of necessity. Upon repeated demands of the 
American manufacturers, the import tariffs of industrial articles were 
raised to 15% in 1804, and after the 1812 war with Britain and the em­
bargo, the practically realized prohibitive tariffs had the consequence 
that there was “such an extraordinary boom of American factories that 
they could satisfy not only home demands, but soon started exportation, 
as well.”8 In 1828 — after some temporary reductions — the textile duty 
rates were raised further, to 40%,9 which resulted in another industrial 
upswing. Friedrich List quotes a report of Massachusetts, one of the most 
advanced textile-industrial states, which reveals a considerable progress 
of the textile-industrial revolution.10 And although from that time to 
the Civil War, the Democratic Party, the ruling party of the southern 
cotton-growing states, pursued a liberal customs policy, it was no longer 
able to make textile development in the north nonexistent.
rfhe feudal foreign trade of France was determined by the customs 
policy of mercantilism in the 17th century, which with its import pro­
hibitions and export subsidies was from the outset a policy of tariff war, 
waged also in practice with Britain, etc. It was nevertheless this policy 
that established at the time of Colbert, and particularly after Colbert, 
the 514 manufacturing units11 which operated at the time of the revolu­
tion, and whose great majority belonged to the branch of the waving and 
spinning trade, and to the silk industry. Needless to say, the protective 
tariffs were exploited not only by the textile factories of the state, but also 
by private ones. In the constituent assembly of the French revolution, 
Goudard, a silk merchant of Lyons, demanded that all foreign goods should 
be prohibited, “Frenchmen should trade only with Frenchmen”.12 In ­
deed, the Convent pursued the policy of prohibitive tariffs, especially 
after 1793, after the declaration of war on Britain. Napoleon, who was a 
supporter of home industries, and ordered to hold industrial exhibitions 
for the first time in France in the first years of the 19th century, pursued 
not only the policy of protective tariffs, but by declaring and enforcing 
the continental blocade against the Britisch, among others practically 
created a complete prohibitive tariff system not only for the industry 
of France, but also of Germany. “Owing to the exclusive possession of the 
domestic market and the lifting of feudal restrictions, the French factori­
es were much more prosperous at the time of the Empire t han at any time
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in the ancien régime”.13 As we shall see, it was especially the development 
of the textile industry that accelerated and formed the basis for the in­
dustrial revolution increasingly. The French protective customs policy 
v'as carried on during the restoration, even in the first decade of the reign 
of Napoleon III. The protectionist grouping in Germany — a natural pro­
cess by that time — was made u]> by the “party” of the bourgeoisie in­
terested in the economic growth of textile manufacturing. This “modern” 
bourgeoisie with its capitalist textile manufacturing was created by the 
Napoleonic continental blocade, because the antecedents — the old Ger­
man linen factories — had been ruined completely by the British coin- 
2>etition. “The protectionist party” writes Schmoller “has long demanded 
tariff protection for the mechanical spinneries” .14 '(’lie birth certificate of 
the German bourgeoisie was exactly the granting of tariff protection by 
the German states which still were — because of their feudal nature — 
mainly tied to agrarian interest. " . . .  The Prussian government had to 
grant them protective tariffs already in 1818. It was by this Customs Act 
that the government officially recognized the bourgeoisie for the first 
time. It was admitted — although with a heavy heart and reluctantly — 
that the bourgeoisie had become a class that is indispensable for the 
country.”15 As a result of an incessant demand of this “protectionist 
party”, the German Zollverein was formed in 1834 which was the funda­
mental safeguard for the development of the German big industry. F. 
List, the remarkable ideologist of this demand, concluded as a result of 
all this: “Germany has made considerable progress in all branches of in­
dustry, if these enjoy protection, particularly in the manufacturing of 
wool and cotton goods for everyday use whose importation from England 
has ceased altogether.”10 The textile-industrial revolution developed 
rapidly in Germany as an effect of all this. In the Hapsburg monarchy 
the mercantilist policy of the 18th century supported the development of 
industrial manufacturing. This helped in the considerable development 
of textile manufacturing in Austria, and particularly in Bohemia. Vet 
the protective system of the monarchy meant no more appreciation of 
the bourgeoisie than the hopeless struggle fought by Bruch for joining the 
Zollverein after 184!) in order to depress the Austrian protective tariffs. 
This effort sprang from the same roots as the Hapsburg idea of bringing 
about the pan-German unity under Hapsburg leadership. In this connec­
tion the commercial and industrial chambers of the Austrian-Bohemian 
bourgeoisie made declarations which “for the most part were patriotic 
effusions and considered the customs union as most necessary, but” - 
and this is the resistance which the bourgeoisie, the loser in the 1848 re­
volution, was cautiously offering to the victorious counterrevolution — 
“mentioned at the same time more or less industrial branches which de­
cidedly would suffer from German industries if the customs frontier would 
lie abolished altogether; as industries to be protected particularly, they 
mentioned beet sugar production, distilling, the iron industry, the mak­
ing of silk goods and several cloths” writes a contemporary.17 The customs 
union did not come about, the Hapsburgs remained outside the Bund.
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The farther east we go, the later we see development of manufactur­
ing in various countries, the later the modern protective tariff system 
was introduced to oust the western competitors, mainly the British. We 
do not discuss here the introduction in the 70’s of the 19th century of 
monopolistic protective tariffs for protecting manufacturing industries. 
This period began in R u ss ia  in the first half of the 19th centurv. In 1821 
Nesselrod introduced the “independent trading system” which essentially 
was a system of protective tariffs. This trend of development eoulcl un­
fold fully especially after the reform of 1861. -Japan, having shifted from 
a semi-colonial status to the road of independent development, was able to 
cancel as a result of the 1868 bourgeois revolution the unequal foreign 
trade agreements not until 1894, when an efficient policy of protecting 
home industries was introduced.18
T h u s  in  countries o f  independen t cap ita list developm ent, the protective  
ta r i f f  p o licy  serving the su p p o rt o f  home in d u strie s  emerged in  the course, of 
the m a n u fa c tu r in g  period  as a n  a im  o f  the bourgeoisie which strived  a fter  
po litica l -  but a t least econom ic  -  leadership . This policy was intended 
for protecting home manufacturing-production from the stronger foreign 
competitors. Consequently the protective tariffs tried to oust first of all 
the textile shipments of England -  the “world’s workshop” -  from the 
home markets so that home industries should grow unhindered on these. 
Protective tariffs also resulted in a redistribution of the national income 
to the disadvantage of the home consumer, and the advantage of the 
country’s bourgeoisie. Home prices are kept high with the help of such 
tariffs, such j»rices drain the purchasing power of the consumer of the 
domestic market, and cover the home producer’s higher costs of produc­
tion which result from an inferior home structure and poorer technical 
facilities. In this way home manufacturing can “compete” oven with 
factories abroad. I bus the home owner of manufacturing units can, and 
does, accumulate major capital to the detriment of the consumer who 
pays a higher than rational price for the home product. Also industrial 
accumulation takes place in the textile branch first of all, just as the vo­
lume of production is the largest in the manufacturing units. B y  red is tr i­
bu ting  the na tio n a l incom e, the protective ta r iffs  provide the basis fo r  cap ita l 
a ccum ula tion  which is  ind ispensable  fo r  bearing the costs o f  the in d u s tr ia l  
revolution. A n d  because the most involved branch is  the textile  in d u stry , 
the in d u s tr ia l revolution  m ust lake its course in  th is  f ie ld  f i r s t  o f  all.
I he true significance in the development of textile manufacturing 
is the fact that it forms the starting-point of further revolutionary deve­
lopments. All the factors that make necessary a m a n u fa c tu r in g  large- 
in d u s tr ia l textile, p roduction , also enforce fu r th e r  technical progress in  th is  
in d u s tr ia l branch. I he extensive division of labour in a manufacturing- 
scale production, the breaking down oí productive work to simple opera­
tions, permits the use of machines, and demands the advent of machines 
thereby. As is the case in the entire field of economy, needs become an im­
perative necessity to produce the articles wanted. Hence the industrial 
revolution took place not “by chance”, and particularly not in the textile
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industry, and still loss in the British textile industry which was leading 
industrial development: the competition of workers employed in produc­
tion, the incessantly growing demands of textile consumption, stimulated 
the producers — and, in general, all those who are in connection with 
the producing masses — to find novel and better means and methods 
of production. Thus, essentially, the industrial revolution takes place 
spontaneously as the effect of the law of value ruling the capitalist mar- 
kid, and along with large-scale, mass production, as the appendix of com­
modity production and the by-product of mental work connected with 
production. Thus it was inevitable that the industrial revolution took 
place in England of all countries, and in textile manufacturing there, — 
when unhindered development was ensured by protective tariffs and state 
subsidies to the other industries — producing  fo r  the f i r s t  tim e  in  the h istory  
o f h u m a n  economics the m a n u fa c tu r in g  in d u s try  n am ely  that o f  textiles.
Marx says of the industrial revolution: . . it is from the machine
tool that the industrial revolution of the 18th century started”.19 ” . . .  il 
we look at the machine in its elementary form, industrial revolution 
starts not from m otive power, but from that part of the machine which the 
English call a Working machine . . . The working machine alone . . .  is 
decisive”.20 Thus it is not abstract, but d iffe ren tia ted  work that is first 
revolutionized by the machine; and here lies the importance of textile 
manufacturing work when the industrial revolution inevitably breaks 
out in this very field. “In 1735 John Wyatt came forward with his spinning 
machine and declared the industrial revolution of the 18th century the­
reby.”21 From that time on the in d u s tr ia l revolution started with the re­
volution in  the textile in d u s try  in  every in dependen tly  developing country  
where, as is known, the leading branch was the textile industry in the 
beginning. Apart from Robert and John K a y  s flying shuttle which made 
weaving quicker, the great industrial inventions served the mechaniza­
tion of spinning work, giving expression to the correlation between ti­
mely needs and the trends of human research. H argreaves's spinning jenny, 
A rkw rig h t's  spinning throstle, C rom pton’s mule have revolutionized spin­
ning, and eliminated thereby not only the disadvantage of spinning com­
pared to weaving, but put weaving to the same disadvantage as spinning 
had been before. Invention of the power-loom was now put on the agenda: 
and indeed, C artw right came forward with his machine. Tn this way the 
textile-industrial revolution took its course from 1764 to 1785 — in a mere 
two decades. It took place quietly, without much ado, but its importance 
went far beyond the consequences of noisy battles. If we take into account 
the advent of an improved power loom in 1804, and keep in mind 1785 
when W a tt's  steam engine was regularly used in spinning, we see that in 
this insular country the textile-industrial revolution was completed from 
the CO’s of the 18tii to the beginning of the 19th century. T h u s  B r ita in 's  
m a n u fa c tu r in g  in d u s try  got f u l l y  developed in  the textile in d u s try  by the 
f i r s t  h a lf o f the 19th cen tury. This was development by leaps and bounds: 
by this abrupt technical change, Britain became the “world’s workshop”, 
at least weaving and spinning shop. As a result of the revolution, produc-
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tivity grew phantastically over that of the past, or over the contemporary 
continental rate. “In the English society . . . the working clay’s producti­
vity grew by 2700 per cent in 70 years, i.e. production was twenty-seven 
times higher in 1840 than in 1770”, writes .Marx.22 This multiplier includes 
a somewhat higher share of spinning than of weaving, and also a share 
by the contributing peasant, homecrafts which still existed in England 
at that time. But this multiplier was certainly high enough for the conti­
nental bourgeoisie to feel safe only if making an industrial revolution of 
their own despite all protective tariffs.
But as concerns the industrial revolution which took its course ex­
tremely rapidly, in a few decades, in England,23 there was in the back­
ground the past of two centuries of the manufactory era, its practice and 
experiments; and the manufacturers of the other countries did not want 
to pass this long school of inventing once more the spinning machine and 
power loom in their own regions. So they tried to achieve their own re­
volution on the soil of the English revolution; frankly spoken, they tried 
to get hold of the secret designs of English machines by resorting to the 
basest industrial intelligence tricks and thefts. If morals are involved at 
all in the ownership relations of the world of capitalism, it is difficult to 
decide which party was robbed worse: English textile capitalism from 
which the industrial secrets were stolen, or the textile capitalists of the 
other countries who suffered from tin; assaults of English textile-industri­
al competition breaking into their markets. In any case, history allows 
of no escape from the inevitable course of development: in order that 
big-industrial development, and all other possibilities of further develop­
ment, be started, the picture outlined above was inevitable.
It was particularly the textile industrialists of the United States of 
America who spared no efforts to get hold of the designs of the English 
machines. Upon an advertisement of the Philadelphia Association in 
1780 a textile worker named Samuel Slater went from Milford (England) 
to America, and eluding export prohibitions, made a drawing of the mule. 
In 1700 the textile factory of Pawtucket was equipped with machines 
made on this design, and this became the first modern American cotton 
spinning mill. Machines of the wool industry were built in similar ways 
in America by the English textile workers John and Arthur Shofield 24 
Needless to say, industrial intelligence work did not cease after this. 
In 1811 Francis C. Lovell of Boston got hold of the secret of the English 
power looms. I he first American textile combine — integrating spinning 
and weaving -  was built at Waltham (Massachusetts) in the same year.23 
The first mule was erected in Gaud (Belgium) in similar ways in 1801.20 
1' rom that time on, certain not too important towns began to grow ra­
pidly on account of their textile factory. The Lievin-Bauwcns factory, 
which was the first to employ such machines, had 220 workers in 1802,' 
but this number grew to 10 000 by 1810. Textile works mechanized si­
milarly in that town grew at a comparable rate.27 Nicolas Schlumberger 
-  who made the finest yarn of France in the early 19th century — erect­
ed his mule in Guebwiller (Alsace). He had learned mechanical spinning in
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England, and made some improvements on the machine of his construc­
tion.'-8 Napoleon, who wanted to ruin Britain also in the industrial field, 
— this was one reason for the continental blocade — supported the use 
of textile machines.29 As Chaptal minister of interior of Napoleon — 
writes, the most widely used textile machine in France — up to 1815 — 
was the mule. From t he second quarter of the 19th century, first of all 
the jenny and the mule, were spreading legally, through purchase. The 
power loom followed gradually. The only — but most important — 
obstacle to this movement was that these hand-made machines were 
very expensive. But even so, the conditions for the textile industrial re­
volution in Central and East Europe were provided in this way. In Ger­
m a n y , mechanization of the textile industry gained momentum not 
until the 1830’s, after t he formation of the Zollverein. “Up to the middle 
of the century, the workers did weaving, even spinning, work at home for 
the most part, and without the use of machines as a matter of course”, 
writes Werner So mb art.30 In 1802, only one wool and one cotton spinning 
mill was operating in Prussia, and the first German mechanized flax 
spinnerv was established in 1810. The slow rate of development appears 
from the fact that in 1846 the Prussian textile industry used not more 
than 452 000 wool, and not more than 170 000 cotton spindles.31 In Ger­
many -  just as in A u str ia  and B ohem ia  — the textile-industrial revolu­
tion (first in spinning, then in weaving) took place in the second half of 
the 19th century. For the continent — and especially for a backward 
Central and East Europe — the 1855 P a ris  W orld  E xh ib itio n  mas o f  ¡/real 
im portance, because there the f i r s t  m echanica lly produced textile m achines  
were d isp layed , which had been m ass-produced at rela tively low cost, 'flic 
efforts of the Central European textile industrialists to mechanize their 
production appears from the fact that the Austrian and Bohemian textile 
capitalists immediately launched a campaign for the duty-free impor­
tation of such machines and they succeeded in an incredibly short time, 
in one year and a half.32 According to Jaroslav Purs, the textile-industrial 
revolution of Bohemia — which was the industrially most advanced 
country of the monarchy — was completed in the principal industrial 
districts and branches by the 50’s of the 19th century.33 Machines were 
used at an increasing rate in R u ss ia  in the 30’s of the 19th century, “mostly 
in the cotton industry . . . which became the best-developed industrial 
production branch in the first half of the 19th century in Russia and 
elsewhere”31, but the industrial revolution actually unfolded only after 
the 1861 reform, in the 1870’s and 80’s. Only one-tenth of raw cotton 
cloth was produced manually, at home, in the 50 provinces of European 
Russia in 1879, nine-tenths were woven in factories.35 In the other branch­
es of the textile industry — wool and especially flax — the process of 
mechanization went on much slower.
The revolution which spread all over Europe and the leading capita­
list countries overseas was attached so passively to the English machines 
only in respect of fundamental inventions: leading textile-industrial po­
wers added their inventions and improvements. In America W h itn ey  in-
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vented the cotton gin in 1793 which greatly contributed to the expan­
sion of the cotton fields by making cotton cheaper; and this was another 
stimulus for the development of the textile industry. The number of tex­
tile-industrial inventions grew in the US from year to year: the number of 
such patents was 473 in 1840, G02 in 1850, and 4819 in I860.3®
In France Jacquard, invented in 1805 the machine weaving patterns 
in silk, and this revolutionized the silk industry. It is easy to see that it 
was not by chance that the English revolution was joined by the invention 
of the gin in America, the home of cottongrowing, and by the Jacquard 
loom in Lyons, the centre of the French silk industry. Here, too, the de­
mands were working -  and not without success -  on the minds of the 
producers. 1 he full play of the textile industrial revolution was greatly 
enhanced b\ inventions of textile chemistry which revolutionized the 
fields of dyeing and finish. Thus the revolution of the textile industry 
was materialized in full.
The manufactory period of independently developing countries gave 
rise to the national bourgeoisie, and to the burgeois revolutions: simi-
larlv, the protective tariff policy of the bourgeoisie assuming power _
or at least sharing power with the landowning class — emerged every­
where in the wake of the revolutions. This policy made possible a rapid 
accumulation of manufactory capital -  textile manufactories first of all 
and covered the investment expenses of the industrial revolution 
which were immense by the standards of that time. (We do not include 
here the sources of accumulation which originated in the plundering of 
colonies, or economic exploitation.) The correlations between these eco­
nomic phenomena are evident, and so are the correlations between eco­
nomic and political events. 1 he economic consolidation, social sweep 
and revolutionary role of the national bourgeoisie are the successive links 
of fhe same chain; the economic power of the national bourgeoisie was 
decisively provided in the beginning by the textile manufactories based 
on peasant homecraft; was increased by the protective tariff system in 
the textile industry; and was multiplied by the industrial revolution. 
The advent of textile factories was the consummation of the rule of ca­
pitalism.
Through the industrial revolution, which first took place in the textile 
blanch, the textile industry became the first capitalist industrial branch 
based on factories. The textile-industrial revolution -  which was the 
introduction to the general industrial revolution -  accelerated capitalist 
development in the field of spinning and weaving considerably. Engels 
vvrites: “In England Watt, Arkwight, Cartwright and others started the 
industrial revolution as a consequence of which the centre of gravity of 
economic power was shifted completely, 'fhe economic power of the bour­
geoisie now grew incomparably faster than that of the landowning aristo­
cracy. Within the bourgeoisie proper, the plutocrats, the bankers, etc. 
were increasingly pushed into the background by the manufacturers.”37 
A. I oynbee, describing the tremendous production increase in the textile 
industry as a result of the industrial revolution -  in the fifteen years from
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1788 to 1803 the cotton industry grew threefold,38 — observes a similar 
social-economic change: “The class of the new capitalist enterpreneurs 
accumulated tremendous wealth”.38 I t is obvious, and this should be 
stated here fortwith, that this change through which the industries, i.e. 
the capitalist industrialists, gained prominence in enrichment over agri­
culture and landoweners, elevated the textile factory owners to the lead­
ing position of all big industries. And it is only too natural that the ad­
vantages of this process were ripened first of all by these factory owners.
The advent of factory-scale production in the textile industry ine­
vitably amplified the capitalist contradictions which were manifest al­
ready at the time of manufactories; both the positive and negative fea­
tures of capitalist production were intensified more than ever before. 
The rapid enrichment of the textile industrialists is connected as a matter 
of course partly with the development of the forces of production, includ­
ing the increase of manpower; on the other hand, however, it is connected 
unth the ra p id  rise o f  the w orking class as the most im portan t social-political 
consequence o f th is  developm en t. We shall see later on the manifestations 
of this contradiction in the increasing volume of textile production and 
the simultaneous, relative narrowing down of the home market, and the 
economic and social consequences of this contradiction. At present we 
are concerned with the upward stage of capitalism which is represented 
by the leading role of the textile industry, and we give an outline of the 
principal trend of this economic development.
As is commonly known, the textile industry — including peasant 
small commodity production — has a lot of potentials to become the 
leading branch in the initial stage of industrial development. It is this 
branch that has available the largest num ber o f  sk illed  (peasant spinner- 
weaver) w orkers; tha t has the largest m arke t; tha t is the most labour- 
dem a n d in g  in this stage of development; and so on. A n d  all th is  app lies  
increasing ly  a fter the advent o f  the factory-based  tea-tile in d u stry . This deve­
lopment has given rise to what might be called a new  lore o f  dem ographical 
changes wherever it took place. According to Mac Culloch’s calculations, 
almost one and a half million people made their living — directly or in­
directly — on the cotton industry in 1834;10 and according to Engels this 
large number grew one and a half times in ten years,11 which meant 
2.2 million people in the cotton industry. And here were further hund­
reds of thousands in the wool, flax and silk trade. The manufacturing in­
dustry also changes radically the existing settlement pattern. Four- 
fifths'of the population of 17-century Britain lived in villages; this was 
changed when the cotton mills grew into urban manufacturing industries. 
“Lancashire, the birthplace and centre of the cotton industry, was tho­
roughly revolutionized; from a remote, poorly cultivated, swampy region 
it was turned into a busy, industrious county, the population grew ten­
fold in eighty years, and, as if by magic, big towns were created such as 
Liverpool and Manchester with a total of 700 000 inhabitants, and the 
border towns Bolton (GO 000), Rochdale (75 000), Oldham (50 000), 
Preston (60 000), Achton and Stalybridge (40 000), and many other in-
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dust rial towns.”42 In three decades (from 1800 to 1831) the cotton industry- 
doubled the inhabitants of the towns of West Riding (Bradford, Halifax, 
Leeds, etc.).4* In Glasgow, the centre of the Scottish cotton region, the 
number of inhabitants grew from 30 000 to 300 000 till 1834,44 etc. The 
towns of the textile district of New England (USA) grew at a similar rate, 
e.g. Lowell, Nashua, Fall River, Manchester, Paterson, etc.45 Such a rapid 
urban development was seen in every country where the textile industry 
forged ahead. In France, for example, the small communities in the vi­
cinity of Lille, Ilouen and Lyons grew into important towns, such as St. 
Etienne, Tarare, Epernay, Amiens, Roubaix, Peronne, Valenciennes, 
etc. Not to speak of the Alsatian textile towns which changed their na­
tional status between France and Germany several times. In Belgium, 
near Gent, towns grew as a result of the developing textile industry, c.<*! 
Verviers, Limbourg, Aix-la-Chapelle,4" which in part also became German 
territory. All this shows that the textile industry turns great masses of 
peasants into factory workers. The largest group of industrial workers — 
33% — was employed in the textile branch in Germany in 1882 (910 
thousand workers);47 this was followed by half as many workers of min­
ing and metallurgy, and the entire branch of heavy industries employed 
a total of 828 thousand workers at that time. Although the bigger labour 
force of the textile industry resulted from a relative technical backward­
ness if compared to the heavy industries, it was still these numbers that 
defined the important role of the textile industry in giving rise to the 
modern working class, the industrial population.48
All this development involved a tremendous expansion of the home 
industrial market, the text ile market first of all. While at the time of the 
peasant homecrafts, only part of the population was buying textiles from 
the peasants, and the peasant artisans remained self-supporting as to 
textiles, the entire population (including the textile Workers) was now 
buying clothes on the national market. And by that time the demands 
were much more refined than formerly at the time of low living standards.
Indeed writes Marx, the events that turned the small peasants into 
wage-workers, and made their tools and means of subsistence the ma­
terial components of capital, at the same time created the home market 
for the latter”. And, naturally, only “the annihilation of rural home­
crafts can make the domestic market of any country so big and stable 
as is required by the capitalist manner of production”.49 Marx also says 
- what is other-wise evident from the reference to rural crafts -  that 
this is essentially an immense increase in textile consumption: “Capital 
quickly forms a domestic market for itself by annihilating all rural se­
condary industries, i.e. by spinning, weaving, making clothes for every­
body. . ”.5° Textiles, especially cotton fabric, were in the greatest demand 
of the masses in the 19th century all over the world, including the back­
ward countries. “It is the cotton industry that made the most spectacular 
and extensive progress in the 19th century. This produces the most im­
portant commodity, and is of the greatest importance to the living and 
earning conditions of the peoples’ writes an economic work of that time.51
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I t is therefore tha t a historiographer of the Belgian industry wrote: 
. there was no need for travelling agents to sell goods — the custo­
mers engaged agents to get some of the products of the Gand factories, 
at the price of gold if need be”.52 A Hungarian economist of that age 
writes: . Not as to quality, but as to volume, the world industry’s
most important activity is the manufacturing of various types of cloth. 
'I'llis, . . . satisfies the widest of demands. And in its various stages, it 
can employ the largest number of workers in the various connected in­
dustries.”53 T h e  f  irst h a lf  o f the 19lh cen tury  — u p  to the 70's — is  indeed  
the era o f  the leading  role o f  the textile  in d u stry . At that time the textile 
factories were in the front line, both in production and trading on the 
market; although the exportation of textiles is considerable from many 
western capitalist countries (especially England), the majority of the in­
dependent capitalist countries still produces for the home market. This 
is the case with the American industry, which was able to meet only 83% 
of home demands up to the 60’s.54 The buyers of Russia’s textiles were 
the Asian territories undergoing capitalist development, and not other 
countries.55 Also the Central European countries protected their textile 
industries instead of competing witli their products on the world market . 
This era represented essentially the upward phase of capitalism which 
preceded imperialism. Still, as we shall sec, it was at this time that ca­
pitalism prepared the next, imperialist, stage through the textile in d u s try  
both on the home and foreign markets.
Over and above all the favourable features of the textile industry 
— big labour force and a wide market — there is a high labour in ten s ity  
following from the inherent technical features of the branch. Processing 
requires considerable industrial work, i.e. many workers must be employ­
ed to turn raw material into finished cotton fabric, wool cloth, linen or 
silk. The more labour-intensive an industrial branch is, the more values 
it produces than agriculture — turning out raw material — or than the 
extractive industries (mining). T h e  ra tio  between these is  the ratio  between 
their im portance or accum ula tion . The greater the labour intensity of the 
textile industry, the more workers must be employed in manufactory pro­
duction; or the more m achines  must be installed to replace workers in 
factory production. There are calculations that in the 60’s of the 18th 
century England produced with machines as many textiles as would have 
been produced by 91 380 000 workers with the manual methods of 1770 
prior to mechanization.55 The volume of textiles produced by such an 
immense — though imaginary — labour force results in an immeasurable 
enrichment of the English textile manufacturers also if exploitation 
during mechanized production “only” affects the two million workers 
actually operating the machines, (although the extra-profit and forced 
unfair barter in the competition on home and foreign markets raised 
this amount several times). Adam Smith, analyzing the labour intensity 
of the industry at the given standards of manufactory production held 
it to be of high significance in respect of the size of labour force and the 
extent of capital profit. “The more intense processing some commodity
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is going through” lie writes,57 “the greater will be the share from its price 
falling on wages and profits than the share falling on the rent. Not only 
the number of profits grow in the course of processing, but each successive 
profit will he greater than the preceding one,, because the capital from 
which it originates must he greater and greater. The capital which employs 
c.g. the weavers, is by necessity greater than the one which employs the 
spinners, because it must not only refind the latter together with the pro­
fits, but must in addition pay the wages of the weavers, and the profit 
must always be in proportion to the capital”. Smith’s conclusion that pro­
fits must always be in proportion to the capital is true in the ease of ma­
nual work (manufactory production), but in the case of mechanized 
work this takes place only after the average rate of profit has come about. 
But this is realized only in part at the time of the textile-industrial revolu­
tion. in any case, it is true also with mechanized production that the more 
labour intensive production is, the greater is either the labour force em­
ployed (and exploitation), or the investment in machinery (and capitalist 
stimulation to realize the average profit); thus, essentially — although 
not at an unchanged proportion — cap ita list p ro fit increases w ith  it.
Yet the degree of labour intensity is not determined once for all, not 
even in the same industrial branch. Together with technological progress, 
improvement of working methods, it shows a downward trend. Thus 
it is not indifferent which country and period is covered by our studies. 
For example, the following indices apply to the British cotton industry 
in the 1860’s: the annual production value of the branch was 52 million 
pounds sterling, of which 18.7 million fall on raw material value;58 thus 
value increase through industrial work is 33.3 million pounds, i.e. 178% 
of the raw material value. The labour intensity of the cotton industry 
was somewhat higher in Central Europe at that time; in the Austrian 
and Bohemian provinces of the Hapsburg monarchy the value increase 
by industrial work was 200% according to our calculations if compared 
to the price of raw cotton as 100%.59 This means that the surplus value 
attainable by the textile manufacturer capitalists is at least 1.7 to 2 times 
higher than what the agrarian capitalist is able to obtain. We shall also 
see how much higher the labour intensity of the textile industry is than, 
say, that of the agricultural industries.
Another asset of the textile industry was that — compared to agri­
culture, even to other industries — the c ircu la tion  a n d  turnover o f  the capita l 
w as in  that period the quickest in  th is  branch. Namely textile production 
is continuous, as contrasted to agriculture and agricultural industries 
(sugar, mills, etc.) where the actual working time is only some months 
in the year; or contrasted to the machine industry where production is 
intermittent (the process is closed only if the whole machine unit is com­
pleted, e.g. in the case of a steam engine, or a seagoing vessel, this takes 
considerable time). The textile industry produces co n tin u o u s ly , and when 
a roll of cloth is finished it can be marketed at once, and this can go on 
all the year through. There is no unnecessary idle time, capital is active 
incessantly, the rate of return is only a few weeks. Hence the same volume
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of capital which returns in agriculture or agricultural industries once a 
year, can do so in the textile industry as often as 8 times or more in a year, 
depending on how near the market is, or how modern transport is which 
takes the products to foreign markets, which practically amounts to an 
eightfold etc. increase of the same volume of capital. And this results as 
a matter of course in a multiplication of profits which we have rated as 
double when we considered labour intensity.
Thus the profit of textile-industrial capital and the resulting accumu­
lation is much higher — owing to a special position and production techni­
que — than in the case of capital invested in agriculture or other industri­
es. But the industrial revolution has put this branch in a disadvantageous 
position in one respect: and this is the amount of capital required for the 
given amount of values produced. I n  th is  period  the tex tile -in d u str ia l capita l 
w as the one o f  the h ighest organic co m p o sitio n , i.e. the proportion of machine 
investments was the highest in it, and consequently the amount of wages 
was the lowest. And this is natural because the proportion of employed 
workers was relatively the lowest in this intensely mechanized branch 
of industry. And this means according to both classical and Marxian 
political economics tha t owing to the relatively low number of workers 
the amount of work provided by them, the amount of new values created 
by them, was relatively low. (As is commonly known, machines and means 
of production in general, only transfer the value incorporated in them to 
the goods produced, but do not create new values.) Hence in the mechaniz­
ed textile industry, the capitalist profit ought to be relatively low pur­
suant to the law of value if compared to the total amount of capital 
invested. Well, but “grey are all theories, and green is the golden tree of 
life”. For the capitalist order of production this contradiction did not 
become an obstacle to the industrial revolution because it is not a funda­
mental contradiction, because it belongs to the field of differences within 
the capitalist class. And this was resolved by the power relations. A t  a  
tim e  w hen the textile  in d u s try  is  the leading branch , the in d u str ia lis ts  a l­
w ays f i n d  m eans a n d  w a ys to get in  exchange fo r  their products a greater 
value than  the real value o f  these products. This was served first of all by 
the protective ta r iffs  which — by the redistribution of the national income 
— yielded greater capitalist profits to the textile industry to the disad­
vantage of the other capitalists. Similarly to this, a new phenomenon 
emerged in capitalist economic life as a consequence of the textile-industri­
al revolution; it was the average rate of profit which brings about a re­
distribution of the total amount of capitalist profit, and again to the ad­
vantage of textile-industrial capital, to the disadvantage of other capital 
of lower organic composition. With its immense amount — bigger than 
any others — the textile capital was anyway an incessant menace to the 
other industrial branches in that it was likely to flow over — in case of 
unfavourable profit trends — to more promising fields and create a mur­
derous competition to the “indigenous” capital there. This menace is 
eliminated by the average rate of profit in such a way that capital of lower 
organic composition gives up part of its profits to the advantage of the
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textile capital of higher organization, u n ti l  a ll typ es  o f  organic cap ita l, 
in  a ll in d u s tr ia l branches, get p ro fits  in  p roportion  to the volum e, i.e. get an  
average pro fit. “ . . . competition creates the average rate of profit” writes 
Engels,80 “by making emigrate capital from industrial branches where 
profits are below average to branches with profits above average”. At 
this time the barter of goods on the market takes place no longer at their 
value, but at the price of production fixed with regard to the average 
rate of profit. B u t th is  developm ent took place slow ly , g radua lly  in  the course 
o f  ca p ita lis t progress, along w ith  the groicth o f  the in d u s tr ia l revolution.
A considerable proportion of the costs of the industrial revolution 
had to be borne by capital of lower organization. T h is  m ade it  possib le  
tha t new, secondary a ccum ula tion  o f  cap ita l took place in  the course o f  i n ­
creasing fa c to ry  production  o f  textiles in  th is  in d u s tr ia l branch.
All these factors had the combined effect that in the capitalist era 
under survey the most im portan t vo lum es o f  cap ita l flo w e d  tow ard the textile  
in d u s try , giving prominence to it among the other production and industri­
al branches of the national economy. T h e  in d u s tr ia l branch which has  
available the biggest cap ita l, the largest labour fo rce , a n d  the broadest m arke ts  
o f consum ers  — and the textile industry was in the front of these three -  
inevitably p la ys  the lead ing  role in  the. na tio n a l econom y. And when as a 
result of the industrial revolution the textile industry ascended to the 
stage of a manufacturing industry, this leading role became still more 
emphatic.
In the first half of the 19th century -  up to the 70’s -  the textile 
industry, escpecially the cotton industry, was the leading branch of the 
entire capitalist world economy.61 Particularly in the capitalist countries, 
but to no smaller extent in backward countries as we shall see its effects. 
According to Friedrich Eist, “the industrial and commercial prominence 
of B r ita in  is to be found mainly in sheep-breeding and wool manufactur­
ing”.82 At the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century this 
leading role was assumed by the other branch, the cotton industry, 
“which at present employs the greater part of the industrial population”.63 
Also as concerns the three criteria of capitalist development listed by 
Engels — elimination ol manual labour, high degree of division of labour, 
and the degree of machine investments -  “the cotton-processing in­
dustry was leading all other branches from the outset, and is still lead­
ing” (in 1845, Gy. T.)64 According to statistics of Queen, the industrial 
production of Britain was as follows in 1839:65
annual production of cotton industry 52.5 m jiounds st.
annual production of broad-cloth industry 44.5 in pounds st.
annual production of flax industry 15.2 m pounds st.
annual production of silk industry 13.5 m pounds st.
textile industry total 125.7 million pounds
all industries total 259.5 million pounds
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Hence in Britain the textile industry amounted to 48.4% of the total in­
dustrial production in 183!), which is a leading  rule indeed. And the British 
industry is not unique in this respect, although the textile industry there 
stands high above the similar branches in other capitalist countries of 
that time.
In the early 19th century, the U n ited  S ta tes  o f  A m e r ic a , for example, 
was just starting on the road to independent capitalist development — 
it was still more or less a colony in the economic respect — and already 
the textile industry became the principal field of industrial production. 
The industrial capital of the US was at that time estimated to be 100 mil­
lion dollars of which some 40 were invested in the cotton, some 12 mil­
lion in the woollen industry,86 more than half the total. Up to the 18G0’s 
the American industrial revolution affected m ostly the textile in d u s try ,87 
which grew rapidly and was leading till the Civil War. By 1850 the total 
production of the cotton industry was estimated at 113 million dollars68 
and there was no other branch to compete with this figure. Industrial 
development was similar in France. Manufacturing industries grew at a 
lively rate during the First Empire as a result of the industrial revolution; 
growth was rapid, although it was far behind that of England. According 
to Moreau de donnés the net production values of the French textile in­
dustry were as follows:69
in 1812 in 1850 
million francs
annual production w'ood industry 238 445
annual production cotton industry 17G 334
annual production silk industry 107 356
annual production flax and hemp industry 195 351
textile industry total 71G I486
all industries total • 3037
Thus the French textile industry — like in the other countries — 
was prominent in total production. I t  accounted in 1850 for 49% of the 
country’s total industrial production, hardly being below the total pro­
duction value of all other branches. Also in G erm any  the textile industry 
w as leading  in the 19th century. As late as 1896 it was still leading with an 
annual production of 2.2 thousand million marks,70 which, true, was only 
15,6% of total industrial output, but even so the second greatest, branch 
— heavy industries — produced only 15.0%. (The food industry was 
ahead of the textile industry only as to gross production value, in net 
value it was behind it.)
Just as these four leading capitalist nations, the other independen t 
ones began to develop with the leading role of the textile industry. Also 
in A u s tr ia  and B ohem ia  of the 19th-century Hapsburg monarchy, the 
textile industry — cotton first of all — was “the most widespread branch, 
which produced the greatest values and employed large numbers of wor­
kers.”71 The rapid growth of the cotton industry appears from the growing
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amounts of cotton imported: in 1828 the customs weight of imported 
cotton was 7.3 million pounds, and some three decades after it was 76.8 
million,72 which is an increase more than tenfold. Production of the cotton 
industry in Itussia grew between 1850 and 1880 from a value of 29 million 
roubles73 to 200 million71, i.e. sevenfold. The textile industry was leading 
also in Italy, but here the leading branch was silk75 which grew especially 
after the Risorgimento. In 1860 the silk production of the entire world 
economy was estimated at 1 thousand million francs, of which Italy pro­
duced 281 million, standing thereby second to China whose production 
was estimated at 425 million.76 Also Japan’s greatest exporting branch 
was silk, representing a value of 22.9 million marks in 1868—70, and 45.8 
million in 1879,77 which is an increase of 100% in less than one decade. 
Thus the textile manufacturing industry became the leading industrial branch 
in all countries of Europe, America and Asia which underwent independent 
capitalist development; and this followed from the antecedents as a matter 
of necessity.
And because the textile industry was leading in mechanization at that 
time, was the producer of the largest masses of commodities, and here is the 
getting back of capital the swiftest and finally in the modern economian 
development this was the most labourintensive, no other industrial branch 
was able to attain that rate of capital accumulation as appeared in the textile 
industry in the f  irst stage of capitalist development. yls a consequence of all 
this, the textile industry became the principal field of national capital 
accumulation, the number one source of producing (he national income.
In the following we give a few typical examples for the accumulation 
of capital in the textile industry. Owing to the incompleteness of early 
statistics, this is not possible on the national scale, so we must use indirect 
data in the absence of direct ones. It ought to be noted that the accumu­
lation of capital (especially in England, but not only there) took place 
not only on domestic markets, but also on foreign ones to a considerable 
extent, and these two sources cannot be considered separately. The foreign 
trade aspects of the textile industry will be discussed in the next part.
In the “capital of the world’s cotton industry”, in Lancashire and 
the surroundings, 1900 spinneries and weaving mills were operating in the 
1870’s. Tremendous production values (machinery, buildings, equipment, 
raw material, money, etc.) were accumulated here and estimated alto­
gether at 57.5 million pounds sterling.78 On the average, 30 thousand 
pounds sterling were the capital for one factory; clearly, this average 
figure tells us not much, because one would tend to think tha t masses 
of medium and small units are involved. But in reality the capital was 
not at all evenly distributed among the companies. A survey of 1500 
companies revealed the following:79
capital of 6 cotton factories over 1 000 000 pounds st.
capital of 12 cotton factories over 500 000 pounds st.
capital of 26 cotton factories over 200 000 pounds st.
capital of 50 cotton factories over 100 000 pounds st.
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capital of 72 cotton factories over 75 000 pounds st.
capital of 101 cotton factories over 50 000 pounds st.
capital of 1233 cotton factories below 50 000 pounds st.
Thus in reality there are a few dozens of big factories, some hundred 
medium, and more than thousand small factories, to form that industrial 
power which was embodied in the 1870’s in Lancashire for the British 
and the world economy. I t admits of no doubt, however, that actual big 
power in this grouping was represented by the big cotton mills of million or 
half a million capital.
Some information on accumulation in entire Great Britain can bo 
derived from the data of raw material consumption. Importation of cot­
ton from the last decades of the 18th century to the 60’s of the 19th show­
ed the following growth:80
Y w eight i n  e r e u s e  3-year m oving
m. pounds im pounds % average o f % grotw h
1781 5 -  -
178C 19.5 14.5 290 -
1800 56 36.5 187 204
1810 132 76 136 113
1820 152 20 15 74
1830 260 108 71 72
1840 593 133 128 70
1850 686 73 12 83
1860 1435 749 109 -
While total cotton imports grew 287-fold, the rates of growth over 
certain shorter phases were most varied. Britain, as the leading capitalist 
nation, was highly exposed to both domestic and world economic crises 
(e.g. in 1825, 1847, 1857 and 18G6) and this is reflected in the fluctuation 
of the data on cotton imports, processing, and — last not least — on accu­
mulation. We use the 3-vear moving averages to give a clear picture of 
of the overall trend. Thus it appears that growth was lasting but not at 
all even. And the moving averages point out the fact that the percental 
growth of the cotton trade reveals a downward, and not an upward trend. 
Naturally, the rate of growth was higher at the beginning when this in­
dustrial branch was small. But the declining rates of growth appearing 
in figures take us to other spheres, which we shall discuss later.
The number of mechanical spindles used in the cotton industry is 
also characteristic of the accumulation of capital. In the third quarter 
of the 19th century — at the peak of development — increase was still 
considerable:81
1850 stock of spindles 21 million
1800 stock of spindles 29 million (34% increase)
1870 stock of spindles 34 million (17% increase)
1877 stock of spindles 39.5 million (15% increase)
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Regarded as an absolute figure, the number of spindles grew by 
18.5 million, almost twofold, but the rate of growth was diminishing here, 
too.
Or let us have a look at the accumulation of capital in the textile 
industry of the US. 51 million dollars had been invested in the cotton 
industry by 1840, and this figure was 98 in I860,8- which was a doubling 
of capital within two decades. The growth of cotton consumption in the 
US during three decades after 1830 was as follows:83
1830 150 000 bales
1845 — 50 300 000 bales increase 100%
1850 -  54 600 000 bales increase 100%
1855 — 60 800 000 bales increase 33%
The number of spindles used in the US cotton industry:84
1831 1.2 million
1860 5.2 million, increase 334%
1877 10.0 million, increase 92.4%
rI'he textile industry of the European continent was similarly rapidly 
developing, and made possible similarly considerable accumulation of 
capital. The cotton consumption in France grew' from 1850 to 1865 from 
59 million kg to 110 million (by 86.5%), wool consumption was 24 million 
kg between 1850 and 54, and 56 million (133% increase) between 1860 
and 64.85 Germany’s cotton imports amounted to 46 million kg between 
1856 and 60, and to 201 million kg between 1886 and 90,86 which is an 
increase of 336% in throe decades. The cotton consumption of the Haps- 
burg monarchy was 16.1 million customs pounds in 1833 (8.05 million 
kg), and rose to 61.6 million customs pounds (by 283%) in 1854.87
The power relations between Great Britain, the European continent 
and the US in respect of cotton industries — and therefore also more or 
less in respect of national economies — may be characterized by the num­
ber of cotton spindles:88
1860 1877 %  grow th
million sp. between 1860 —77
G reat B rita in  29.0 39.5 36.1
E uropean con tinen t 13.3 19.6 47.4
US 5.2 10.0 92.4
Engels, who himself was a textile manufacturer, was familiar with 
the situation of the German and British textile industry, and in a letter 
of 1890 he characterized the average rate of profit attainable in the text ile 
industry like this: “ . . . in the British, French and German textile factories 
the profit is nowadays . . . 10, 15, or at most 20%, and in the very rare 
years of prosperity a profit of 25 — 30% is regarded here as very r/ood. 
In the childhood of modern industry, (higher rates — T. Gy.) of profit
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can be ensured only by factories where the latest and best type of machi­
nery is working . . . ”.8U Thus ure may draw the conclusion from the abso­
lute figures of accumulation and from the percental rate of capital profit 
alike that the growth of the capitalist textile industry — we might as 
well say its virulence — is the strongest in the first period of capitalism; 
but as progress takes its course, this momentum shows a downward trend.
This phenomenon is remarkable in itself because it tells of the dece­
lerating tendency in the development of capitalism. But in order to avoid 
any misunderstanding it must be kept in mind that this slowingdown 
tendency is accompanied by the expansion of production, because a minor 
growth of a greater mass of means of production has a much greater re­
sult in absolute figures than are the production results of a more rapid 
growth of means of production of a lower total amount. Hence what is 
decreasing here is the rate of growth; and what is growing is production 
itself. Bigger accumulation of capital with lower production is nothing 
else but the sum total of the robbing, exploiting activities of the begin­
nings of capitalism enforced with the most brutal and barbarous means. 
The tendency of further development is the gradual domination of “re­
gular” exploitation by economic means, and the pushing into the back­
ground of extra-economic, “unlawful” measures (although it follows from 
the essence of capitalism that the role of extra-economic means conti­
nues to be important also later on).
Be that as it may, the decrease of the growth rate of capit alist textile 
industries is still a remarkable phenomenon in an era where the textile 
industry was leading: it indicates that its prominence as the decisive fac­
tor in the capitalist economy is now on the decline. At this point this is 
not yet its falling back to a secondary role in the accumulation of capital 
— it only forecasts the coming of this event in the not too distant future. 
'Phe 1870’s are the beginning of a rapid development of the heavy industri­
es — iron and machine industry first of all — which then ascend to the 
leading role in the age of imperialism. As we shall see, the capital accu­
mulated in the textile industry is actively involved in this development ; 
and by flowing over to the heavy industries, it increased the rate of growth 
there abruptly, while this resulted in a decrease in the textile industry.
The Table showing the rates of growth in the three major areas of 
production in I860 and 1877, also reveals that these rates are very diffe­
rent even in the same periods. The growth rate is the highest in the US 
(92.4%), lower in the countries of the European continent (47.4%), and 
lowest in Great Britain (36.1%), while textile production is the highest in 
the world in this insular country, major on the European continent, and 
lowest in the US. This appears also from the number of spindles used. 
Hence what is hidden behind these different rates of textile development is 
actually the différend levels of capitalist development proper, or, concretely, 
the three developmental stages of free-competition capitalism. In any ease, 
the textile-industrial results manifest in the accumulation of capital are 
still in the front in all the three areas (and these represent the leading 
economies of this age in respect of commodity production increase). And
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although the figures foretell coming changes also here, textile is still the 
leading industrial branch in the entire world of capitalism. And the most 
remarkable fact for the purpose of this study is that the textile industry 
continues to be decisive in the emergence of a capitalist world economy 
as well.
I t is a well known contradiction of capitalism that there is on the one 
hand a tremendous increase of production, and, on the other, a holding 
back of the living standards of the great masses of consumers, the workers 
and peasants. I lie increase in the mass of products, and the consumption 
capacity of the masses usually form scissors, even if this capacity does not 
decrease by absolute figures in certain countries. This phenomenon was 
defined by Engels as capitalism destroying its own domestic market. We 
know the manifestations, the crises of overproduction, which are the nodes 
of these contradictions developing at given times. And when the commo­
dities cannot be sold on the home market, the bourgeoisie considers the foreign 
markets, foreign trade, as the “solution" of this contradiction. Yet in reality 
foreign trade solves nothing, it moreover expands the field in which this 
contradiction unfolds. That this problem assumes similar features in 
respect of the textile industry, the subject of our study, is obvious. .More­
over, it is valid first of all in the case of this leading branch.
The same causative factors which made the textile industry f lic lead­
ing branch in independently developing capitalist countries, explain why 
the capitalist world market has emerged as a textile market first of all. The 
capitalist world economy has developed in terms of textile. The correla­
tion between the internal development of leading capitalist countries and 
the nature of the world economy shaped by them is evident. The wealthy 
polit ¡co-military big powers, which influenced the international division (if 
labour according to the supply and demand on their own home markets, 
protected first of all the interests of their leading branch, the textile 
industry, as a matter of course. They wanted to find  buyer's markets for 
their textile products in the countries subjected to their rule, and wanted to 
get textile raw materials there. And because the cotton industry was lead­
ing among the textile branches — and cotton was usually not grown in 
the countries of the temperate zone — world trade was concentrated on 
the raw produce, semi-finished and finished goods of the cotton industry. 
(The United States of America, the chief cotton supplier of the world, 
was up to I860 mentioned as the “cotton colony of Britain”.) I t is there­
fore that the historian of world trade wrote in the (id’s of the 19th century 
that “there is no other article which could be nearly as important for 
trade as is cotton. The prominent position of this article in world trade 
has consolidated at the end of the 18th century. . . ”.<J0 The leading posi­
tion of the text ile industry in the 19th century is reflected in the statistics 
of the turn of the century, although this prominence was gradually eclips­
ed by the heavy industries from the 70’s. Still, the per cent of textiles in 
the world trade of finished goods was still the highest of the three prin­
cipal groups of industry:91
1890 1913
per cen t ra tio
T extiles and clothes 49.4 35.1
H eavy  in d u s try  38.9 40.2
O ther (chiefly food industry) 20.7 18.7
T o ta l 100.0 100.0
Thus the finished goods of the heavy industries assumed the lead­
ing role over textiles in the first decade of the 20th century.
It was first of all Great Britain, the “world’s workshop’’, that insisted 
on the expansion of foreign trade: at the end of the 18th and in the first 
third of the 19th century, the insular country was chiefly a textile “work­
shop”, the “central factory” supplying the countries involved in world 
trade with textiles. Britain’s capitalist production — says Hilferding — 
was “incomparably more elastic and expansive” than that of other Euro­
pean countries of that age, and as a result “very promptly satisfied and 
surpassed the demands of newly explored markets, and the reaction was 
overproduction in textiles . . .  Otherwise the textile industry tried to 
expand extremely rapidly.”92 At the close of the second decade of the 19th 
century (1819 — 1821) GG.6%, i.t. two-thirds, of the products of the British 
cotton industry went on foreign markets. This ratio continued to grow 
up to the middle of the century: while the mass of products grew almost 
4 times and a half, the portion exported grew to 71.4% i.e. almost three- 
quarters of the entire production volume.93 Thus the British textile in­
dustry is the result of a particular production policy: it was based on the 
effort to produce instead of as many other countries as possible, but also 
to accumulate industrial capital instead of the bourgeoisie of as many 
countries as possible; it was based on tho effort to build up tlie industry in 
its own economy instead of as many other countries as possible, and at the 
same time to ensure tlie highest national income in its own territory and 
not in others. This is a strange “division of labour” originating in that 
fundamental division of labour according to which Great Britain is the 
“world’s workshop” and the other countries are the “agricultural raw 
material suppliers” gathering round it.
This was the state of affairs against which the bourgeoisie of inde­
pendently developing capitalist countries protested with increasing vigour 
in the 19th century. It was therefore that the vulgarmaterialist Henry 
Charles Carey representing the national bourgeoisie went beyond the 
American Alexander Hamilton’s “industrial educative tariffs” bv demand­
ing higher protective tariff rates; that the educative tariffs of the French 
vulgar Jean Baptiste Say grew into the complete prohibitive customs of 
Napoleon’s “Continental System”; that Friedrich List’s demand for pro­
tective tariffs crowned all earlier drafts of the German bourgeoisie in the 
middle of the 19th century; and so forth. Even such a relatively back­
ward country as Australia produced its protective-tariff ideologist in 
the person of Svme. All this was to counterbalance the effects of British 
textile exports. As Wilhelm Roscher termed it, protective tariffs are the
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economic war of all countries against all others. Yet this is overgeneraliza­
tion; in reality, here every country was fighting with protective tariffs 
the one that was stronger, and because the strongest country was Great 
Britain, the protective tariffs of the early 19th century were all directed 
against it. As List said in the early 40’s: “Today England produces cotton 
and silk in the value of 70 million pounds sterling, supplies all of Europe, 
the entire world . . . And what did those profit who purchased these goods 
so inexpensively? The British profited strength, immeasurable strength; 
the rest profited the opposite of strength”.94
As a result of the protective tariffs, British cotton was increasingly 
ousted from the European continent. And because Britain had vital stakes 
in maintaining the total volume of exports,93 it tried to capture new mar­
kets. The export pattern of British cotton changed substantially as a re­
sult:90
C otton export m arkets 1820 1850
in export o f co tton  %
E uropean  countries 5 1  16
A m erica, A ustralia  40 40
Asia, A frica 9 4 4
T otal 100 100
Thus Great Britain compensated decreasing European exports by 
enforcing the free importation of cotton textiles to economically backward 
continents, Asia first of all, to which 31% of exports were shifted. Any­
way, “Britain is exporting to the overseas countries more than the entire 
continent together” concluded Marx in the early 50’s.97 Thus it became 
evident that the textile exports of the capitalist countries could take 
place only in opposition to Great Britain, by conquering from it in part 
at least the Brit ish text ile export markets. And these were first of all mar­
kets in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
Competition in the textile industry is gradually taking shape on the 
world market in the second half of the 19th century, and is manifest first 
of all in a rivalry between Great Britain and the other capitalist states. 
In the beginning this trend is developing slowly because of a still tremen­
dous quantitative difference. Here is a comparison of the textile exports 
of some western countries, in I860:98
T extile  exporters % ratio  of exports
G reat B rita in  67.6
France 26.8
Belgium 3 .3
USA99 2.3
T o ta l 100.0
Thus Creal Britain accounts for two-thirds of the exports of the leading 
capitalist countries in the 60's of the 19th century. France for somewhat over 
one-fourth, and America and Belgium for the rest. Those latter two -
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and Germany not shown here — soon became serious rivals of Britain in 
the heavy industries.
The textile-industrial competition on the world market is not homo­
geneous. The leading branch for (¡real Britain is cotton, while for France 
it is silk, and this further complicated the competition pattern. Here are 
the distribution ratios:100
Textile exporters C otton W ool F lax  Silk
% d istribu tion
B rita in  90.4 03.4 7(5.0 10.5
Franco 4.7 28.7 (5.5 89.5
Belgium 0.9 (5.(5 17.5 —
l ;SA_________________________________ 43)__________ K3_________ -   - __
T o ta l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
It appears, then, that in the cotton industry Britain has no real 
rival — but it has one in silk. And although these two textile branches do 
not compete directly, they nevertheless determine the territories for which 
the capitalist states strive as markets.
The textile foreign trade of France — mainly in silk — developed to 
a considerable extent chiefly with the Levant, with Turkey and Syria 
first of all; this was the ease also with the Far Fast, e.g. China, Japan, 
etc., which France supplied with silk cloth, woollen cloth and flax cloth. 
To Turkey and Asia Minor, France delivered textiles in the value of 144.7 
million francs in 18(51. and this figure was 234.2 million in 1876. At the 
same time the trade with Egypt grew from 48 to 04.1 million francs, in 
the Far East from annual 6 to 01.8 million with China alone, and with 
Japan to 21.7 million francs,101 half of the goods being the aforesaid tex­
tiles.102 From the middle of the 1850’s, also the US traded at a growing 
rate with the Far East, and on an increasing scale with Latin America.103 
Trade with these countries was not too important up to the last decades 
of the century, but was a period of preparing for the later competition 
which greatly affected Britain’s foreign trade interests. US exports of 
cotton culminated in the 1870’s, at least as concerns value and the share 
in total exports; the exported cotton value of the US was 71.98 million 
dollars in 1850, and this sum grew to 191.8 million by 1860, and to 227 
million by 1870. But on the average of the 1875 — 79 period, the value of 
exported raw cotton was only 179.3 million.101 The US was not chiefly 
competing with Britain in the cotton industry, although it did it also in 
this field; but other countries became menacing competitors exactly in 
this field. Such was Russia in the second half of the 19th century, not pri­
marily with the volume of production, but rather with its presence in Asia. 
Broadcloth and cotton cloth trade between Russia and China was con­
siderable already in the first half of the century, and sometimes amounted 
to 15% of Russia’s all customs revenues.105 The clash of interests became 
acute between Britain and Russia in the 1830 — 40’s during the struggle 
for the textile markets of Turkey and Persia.106 The flow of Russian textile 
to Central Asia grew abruptly in the second half of the century, and ex-
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ports grew 12 and halftim es between 1758 and 1853.107 At the same 
time Britain ousted Russian textiles from China more and more,108 and 
this trade struggle was the immediate antecedent of the British— Russian 
differences in the Far East. At the end of the 19th century Japan, taking 
a growingly independent course of development, appeared on the scene 
as a new rival not only in silk, but also in the delivery of cotton cloth. 
And the German textile industry emerged as a competitor late in the 
19th century, It appears, then, that competition in the textile industry teas 
afield where the clashes of interests of the leading capitalist nations became 
particularly acute. But even so, the competition in the textile industry 
was only the beginning of differences which had the roots in the efforts 
to conquer markets and which sharpened rapidly at the end of the 19th 
century. This classical stage of capitalism characterized by the leading 
economic position of the textile industry, was only the overture to this 
course of development which reached its climax in the stage of imperialism 
later on.
Marx points out the importance of foreign trade in a capitalist society, 
which role is manifest increasingly. “Capital invested in foreign trade 
can yield higher rates of profit because here such capital competes with 
commodities turned out by other countries in less favourable circumstanc­
es of production, so that the more advanced country sells its commodities 
above price even if it actually sells cheaper than the countries compet­
ing with it .. . The country in a more favourable position gets more work 
in return for less work although this difference, this surplus is being 
pocketed by a certain class, just as in case of exchange between work and 
capital.”100 The bourgeois apostles of free trade advocate the contrary 
— led by the textile big industrialists of Manchester — and try to convince 
their trade partners thrown at their mercy as markets that this is mutually 
advantageous for both nations taking part in this trading. “If the free­
traders fail to understand how a country can get richer to the disadvant­
age of another” writes Marx, “this is no wonder because these gentlemen 
do not want to understand how a class can grow rich to the disadvantage 
of another within the same country”.110 The exportation of textiles by the 
capitalists of highly industrialized countries to backward countries isnothing 
else but the worst form of international capitalist exploitation of that time. 
These chapters of classical capitalism are the most immediate preparatory 
events for spreading imperialism and colonization all over the globe, and for 
unfolding the contradictions of the. capitalist manner of production on a 
world wide scale.
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